A widely cited benefit of a fixed exchange rate regime is that it reduces borrowing costs. Using a new dataset consisting of more than 450,000 monthly stock and bond returns, we investigate the effect of adhering to the gold standard on borrowing costs in the late 19 th century. Conditional on business cycle risk, there is no evidence that a portfolio of assets issued by countries off gold earned higher excess returns than a portfolio of assets issued by countries on gold. Overall, the returns to both stocks and bonds issued by countries on and off gold are statistically indistinguishable from one another. These results persist even when we allow the Victorian trader to anticipate perfectly a change in adherence to the gold standard. More broadly, we find that the exchange rate regime mattered less for borrowing costs than previously thought.
Introduction
Governments cannot simultaneously maintain an open capital market, retain monetary policy autonomy, and fix their exchange rates. This trilemma forces governments to make trade-offs among these goals by choosing two of the three objectives (Obstfeld et al. 2005) . In the 19 th century, governments opted for the perceived benefits of open capital markets and fixed exchange rates at the cost of an independent monetary policy.
The costs of the gold standard are well known. For example, Temin (1991) , Eichengreen (1992) , and Bernanke (1995) lay much of the blame for the spread and severity of the Great Depression on the gold standard. On the other hand, the benefits of the gold standard remain the subject of debate. Until recently, the most widespread theory viewed a country's adherence to the gold standard as a credible signal of a country's commitment to prudent fiscal and monetary policy (Bordo and Rockoff 1996) . This "good-housekeeping" interpretation of the gold standard produces an obvious testable implication: Countries that tied their currencies to gold should have been rewarded with a lower cost of capital. Available 19 th century asset data were too sparse for researchers to evaluate this hypothesis directly by comparing the returns of assets issued by countries on and off gold. Instead, past tests of the good housekeeping hypothesis compared observable coupon yields or capital flows between countries. These data have proven insufficient to resolve the question. Researchers have reached contradictory conclusions depending upon the choice of sample countries, empirical specification, and fiscal and monetary control variables.
For example, Bordo and Rockoff (1996) examined the coupon yields of sovereign bonds and found that pre-World War I yields "differed substantially from country to country" and that "these differences were correlated with a country's long-term commitment to the gold standard." 2 Their findings are consistent with the country studies of Martin-Acena (1993) and Sussman and Yafeh (2000) , and have been confirmed in a larger sample of countries by Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) .
On the other side of the debate, Ferguson and Schularick (2006) argued that membership in the British Empire, rather than adhering to the gold standard, was the key 2 Bordo and Rockoff (1996), pp.416 to low borrowing costs. Clemens and Williamson (2004) examined capital flows rather than bond yields and concluded that "gold was nowhere near the most important determinant of [capital] flows" and gold standard adherence paled in importance compared to the fundamental determinants of capital productivity. 3 Flandreau and Zumer (2004) viewed the good-housekeeping hypothesis most pessimistically. They argued that international lenders focused almost exclusively on a country's ability to repay its foreign obligations and paid little attention to a country's monetary regime. Like previous authors, Flandreau and Zumer examined sovereign bond coupon yields but found that adhering to the gold standard had a negligible influence once one controls for measures of sound public finances.
Past tests of the good housekeeping hypothesis have reached mixed conclusions about the effect of the gold standard on borrowing costs due to differences in the sample of countries, model specification, and controls for non-gold risk factors. It is unlikely that a consensus will be reached with the existing data. Adjusting for risk is difficult when working with coupon yields rather than expected returns and no a priori criteria exist to disentangle competing specifications.
We introduce a more direct test based on a new dataset. Our data consist of the realized holding period returns of almost every stock and sovereign bond traded in London between 1870 and 1907. Using realized returns is novel for tests of the good housekeeping hypothesis, but our test methodology is routine in the finance literature when evaluating the hypothesis that the market demands a risk premium for holding assets with an observable trait. 4 Data limitations have prevented past authors from employing return-based tests of the good housekeeping hypothesis. Our dataset addresses this shortcoming.
Our dataset contains over 450,000 realized 28-day security returns collected from late 19 th and early 20 th century financial publications. These data allow us to apply to the Victorian age the same empirical methods researchers use to identify characteristics associated with risk and return in modern capital markets. Our principal finding is that adherence to the gold standard did not reduce the cost of capital. Thus the market did not value the gold standard as a signal for sound financial policies. Across a variety of specifications and samples, there is no link between a country being on the gold standard and the realized risk-adjusted return of its stock and sovereign debt. Conditional on business cycle risk, the returns of assets issued by countries on and off gold are statistically indistinguishable from one another. An investor who selected assets based on gold standard adherence would not outperform an investor who selected assets at random.
The next section discusses the empirical implications of the theory of the gold standard as a repeated game. Section 2 discusses the similarities and differences between tests based on coupon yield and expected return. Section 3 describes our data and empirical specifications. Section 4 reports our results and Section 5 concludes.
The Gold Standard as a Repeated Game
Bordo and Kydland's (1995) model postulates that the gold standard functioned as a credible commitment mechanism to overcome the time inconsistency problem associated with international borrowing and lending. Countries and international lenders are engaged in a repeated game, and each period the government can raise funds with a mix of taxes and borrowing. Governments prefer to borrow on favorable terms and promise to follow fiscal and monetary policies that maximize the probability that investors are paid back in valuable currency. In the absence of a credible commitment mechanism, this promise is time inconsistent. Once investors have loaned funds, these funds are inelastically supplied and future governments have three possible sources of revenue: (1) they can sell bonds to future bond investors; (2) tax future citizens directly; or (3) tax past bond investors indirectly by devaluing the purchasing power of their currency. A future government that chooses the optimal mix of borrowing, taxation, and inflation to minimize dead-weight loss will choose to tax assets that are inelastically supplied, and a welfare-maximizing government has the incentive to tax bondholders implicitly by inflating away the value of its outstanding debt. Today's investors recognize that future government policy is time-inconsistent and are unwilling to loan funds today without a credible guarantee that the future government will repay its debt in real terms.
In a one-shot game the problem of time inconsistency is insurmountable and the government is forced to finance expenditures with taxes. Borrowing becomes possible in a repeated game when future bond investors force future governments to follow sound financial policies. International lenders can achieve this outcome with a tit-for-tat strategy. They reward a government that promises to follow sound fiscal and monetary policies with a low cost of capital today. If the future government deviates from sound policies, future lenders punish the future government by raising its cost of capital. Each period the government faces a choice between the benefit of cheating (implicitly taxing the inelastically supplied funds of past bond investors with inflation) and the cost of cheating (the loss of reputation and with it future low-cost borrowing). As long as the present value costs of cheating outweigh the benefits, the government finds it optimal not to debase the currency.
To implement this strategy, the bond market must be able to monitor the government's behavior. A government can signal the international bond market that it is following sound fiscal and monetary policies. This signal must be consistent with the government policy and easy for international investors to observe. This amounts to a signal that the government is not devaluing their currency and is adhering to policies that make it unlikely it will devalue in the future. Adherence to the gold standard can serve as such a commitment device. The empirical implication of the good housekeeping hypothesis is that the capital market assigns a lower price, and demands a commensurately higher return, to assets issued by countries that have abandoned gold.
The Collective Action Problem
One problem with the good housekeeping explanation is that it requires investors to act collectively. The gold standard's repeated game equilibrium relies upon the capital market collectively forgoing present day profits to punish governments that deviate from sound money. With many participants, this equilibrium requires a collective action mechanism to prevent arbitrage-seeking investors from pushing the prices of otherwise identical onand off-gold assets together. Large institutional investors, who were both sufficiently patient to play the punishment strategy and large enough to influence equilibrium prices, are good candidates to punish countries that abandoned the gold standard. Historical candidates include the Council of Foreign Bondholders (CFB) and large investment banks. The former was a corporation representing the British bondholders of countries that had defaulted on past obligations. The CFB tried to punish past sinners by restricting their access to the London bond market (Esteves 2005) . The available archival evidence suggests that the CFB was effective at organizing lenders when borrowers defaulted and renegotiating debt with the larger borrowers, such as Argentina, Brazil, and Turkey (Mauro and Yafeh 2003) . Investment banks also behaved in a manner consistent with a repeated-game grim strategy. Investment banks that underwrote an offering often refused to underwrite new offerings until the country made previous bondholders whole. Whether these organizations were sufficiently large to affect equilibrium prices and punish cheaters is the empirical question our paper addresses.
The Good-Housekeeping Hypothesis, Coupon Yields, and Expected Returns
Given a bond with future expected cash flow { } The expected return is unobservable but it can be estimated from ex post realized returns. If financial markets are informationally efficient, the realized ex post return of any asset is the sum of its expected return and an independent mean zero random error
Sample average returns converge to their expected value, and the average ex post holding period return is a good proxy for the actual unobservable expected return.
Controlling for Risk with a Relative Pricing Model
The good-housekeeping hypothesis predicts that, holding all else equal, assets of countries adhering to the gold standard trade at higher prices (lower expected return) than assets issued by non-gold standard countries. As we discussed above, this hypothesis is not easy to evaluate because expected returns are unobservable. Consequently, economists must use proxies such as coupon yield or realized holding period returns.
Both expected returns and coupon yields of assets vary for reasons other than the credibility of the issuing government's monetary regime. Past tests of the goodhousekeeping hypothesis have relied on available bond yields and attempted to control for other factors by estimating regressions of the form
where is a proxy for expected return such as coupon yield; is a dummy variable equal to one if the country is on gold; captures common changes in all yields and is the yield on British consols or an average of the coupon yields on all bonds; and is a vector of country specific fiscal and monetary variables designed to capture differences in economic fundamentals and the ability to repay debt. The test of the good-housekeeping hypothesis amounts to a test that
Authors have estimated different versions of equation (4) criteria to sort competing models, we are pessimistic that this debate will be resolved with existing methods and data.
Hence, we suggest a different test based on realized holding period returns. Both the coupon yield and the realized return are correlated with unobservable expected return, but realized return is a better proxy for expected return. The realized return also allows us to control for confounding risk factors with the same methods that economists use to investigate the performance of contemporary bond portfolios.
Our method sidesteps the need to determine which variables 19 th century investors used to determine an asset's risk. Instead we use a relative pricing model that compares the returns of assets issued by countries on or off gold to a control group of British assets.
In the contemporary asset-pricing literature, economists commonly use similar methods to compare the expected returns of assets selected by observable criteria such as fund manager skill (Jensen 1967) , accounting fundamentals (Fama and French 1992) , and past returns (Jegadeesh 1990 ). In a paper very similar in spirit to ours, Cornell and Green (1991) use this methodology to control for confounding risk factors when comparing the performance of bonds sorted by investment grade. In addition, Elton, Gruber, and Blake (1995) employ similar methods to examine the risk factors in modern bond index portfolios.
Data and Empirical Specification
According to the good housekeeping hypothesis, international lenders punished countries that did not adhere to the gold standard by demanding a higher risk-adjusted return. We test this hypothesis by forming managed portfolios that mimic the returns an investor would have earned had he purchased a portfolio of assets issued by countries off gold and sold short a second portfolio comprised of assets issued by countries on gold.
Put more colloquially, a Victorian investor wakes up every 28-days, sells a portfolio consisting of assets issued by countries adhering to the gold standard and buys a portfolio of assets issued by countries off gold. If the Victorian investor demanded a higher return for the assets of countries off gold, this strategy should generate risk-adjusted excess returns. Our empirical test amounts to testing the null hypothesis that a Victorian investor could use his knowledge that a given country adhered to the gold standard adherence to beat the market on a risk-adjusted basis.
The key words in the previous paragraph are "risk-adjusted". We take no stand on the underlying determinants of risk and return. Instead we take returns as given and compare the return of any foreign asset to the return of a similarly risky portfolio of British assets. The main advantage of this approach is that it addresses the problem that countries did not leave gold randomly. If a country wanted to remain on gold but was forced off due to a negative business cycle shock, we need to be careful not to conflate the business cycle risks with the repeated game punishment. Business cycle shocks may be correlated across countries and British investors may legitimately demand higher expected returns as compensation for holding greater business cycle risk. In such a case, the good housekeeping hypothesis could be false but the return on the assets of countries that remained on the gold standard would be smaller due to smaller exposure to business cycle risk. By comparing foreign returns to a control group of British assets, we disentangle the two effects and assess if investors demanded a premium due to gold standard adherence or business cycle risk.
We control for risk by estimating the regression
where is the time t return on the British Consol; is the return on the valueweighted portfolio of all British stocks at time t; and is the value-weighted portfolio of British corporate bonds. We use the London banker's bill rate as a proxy for the risk-free rate.
α is often known as "Jensen's alpha" after Jensen (1967) If a Victorian investor actively manages the portfolio in equation (5), α is a measure of the manager's ability to beat a portfolio of British assets with the same risk.
The good housekeeping hypothesis implies that an investor could outperform British assets by selecting assets based on gold standard adherence. We test this hypothesis by forming an excess return portfolio that is long assets issued by countries off of gold and short assets issued by countries on gold. The resulting regression equation is given by:
where . Thus, a test of the good housekeeping hypothesis amounts to a test that ) ( , ,
α is greater than zero.
Data
Our tests require a high frequency database of asset returns, and data limitations have prevented past researchers from applying these relative pricing tests to the good housekeeping hypothesis. We address this shortcoming by collecting a large sample of stocks, sovereign bonds, and colonial bonds trading on the London Stock Exchange between 1870 and 1907. These data consist of the bid and ask prices and dividend (coupon) payments for virtually every foreign and British stock and foreign government bond regularly quoted on the exchange. The data set includes 213 sovereign bonds issued by 36 countries, 110 colonial bonds issued by 12 British colonies, and 1808 stocks issued by corporations in 44 countries. The prices were sampled every 28-days from the official quotation list published in the Money Market Review and The Economist. We use the price and dividend (coupon) data to compute a time series of realized holding period returns corrected for dividends, stock splits, and defaults. 
Managed Portfolios
We form test portfolios that mimic the return an investor would have realized had he actively managed his portfolio by purchasing all assets issued by countries off gold and sold short all assets issued by countries on gold. When a country adopts the gold standard, we remove the country's assets from the off-gold portfolio and add it to the ongold portfolio.
We rely upon a variety of contemporary and modern sources to date each country's gold-standard adherence. A detailed list of sources and gold standard dates are in Appendix 1. In cases where it is difficult to determine de jure versus de facto adherence to the gold standard, we code the country as adhering to gold from the de jure convertibility date. In many cases, we are able to date gold standard adherence quite precisely, identifying the month and sometimes even the day, on which the currency became convertible into gold. In the cases where we can only identify the year in which a country adopted the gold standard, we date gold standard adherence from January 1. In the empirical section of the paper, we assess the robustness of our conclusions to alternative dating conventions.
Sample Countries
One potential explanation for the lack of consensus among previous tests of the good housekeeping hypothesis is that each study uses a different sample of countries. We have assets from a much larger sample of countries than previous authors. To evaluate the extent to which our results are driven by the countries selected, we evaluate the hypothesis with our full sample of countries and with subsamples corresponding as closely as possible to the countries used in Bordo and Rockoff (1996) , Bordo and Schwartz (1996) , Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) , and Flandreau and Zumer (2004) . In all cases, we are able to mimic closely each subsample of countries. The details of how we coded adherence to the gold standard and our sources are contained in Appendix Table 1 and Appendix 2.
Country Weights
When forming our portfolios we must determine how much weight to give to the assets of each country. We form both value-and equally weighted portfolios. Our valueweighted portfolio simply weights each asset by its market value. For example, if the market value of all Russian bonds is twice the value of Italian bonds, Russia receives twice the weight of Italy in our calculations. To evaluate the robustness of our results we also compute test portfolios where each country receives equal weight within the portfolio. We form equally weighted portfolios by first computing value-weighted portfolios for each country and then forming our managed portfolio by investing an equal amount of money in each country portfolio.
Stocks Versus Bonds
Past tests of the good housekeeping hypothesis have focused exclusively on sovereign bonds. This is not surprising in light of the theoretical framework that models the gold standard as a repeated game between governments and the international capital market. Furthermore, coupon yield based tests cannot be applied to stocks that pay variable and unknown dividends. In contrast, our return-based tests can be applied to portfolios of stocks or bonds. We compute both managed sovereign bond portfolios and managed stock portfolios. Exchange rate volatility affects the private cost of capital in modern day developing markets (Solnik 1983) . Adding stock portfolios allow us to assess the effects of adhering to the gold standard on the private cost of capital.
Empirical Results
Tables 1 and 2 contain average returns and regression results for the valueweighted and equally weighted portfolios. Panel A reports the results for portfolios comprised of sovereign bonds. The strategy of buying assets issued by countries off gold and shorting assets issued by countries on gold did generate positive returns, but virtually all of these excess returns were due to differences in business cycle risk. Controlling for differences in business cycle risk, the return of off gold and on gold portfolios were indistinguishable.
Depending on weighting scheme and the sample countries examined, an investor who selected assets based on gold standard adherence would have earned an average 28-day excess return between 11 and 19 basis points, amounting to an excess return of 1.4%-2.5% per year. This excess return is attributable to differences in business cycle risk and does not reflect a market punishment for violating the rules of the gold standard. Once we control for risk by comparing the managed portfolios to similarly risky British assets, the excess returns vanish. Had an investor purchased a portfolio of British assets with the same business cycle risk, he would have earned the same return as an investor who selected assets based upon adherence to the gold standard. Regardless of sample countries or weighting scheme, the α is economically small and statistically insignificant.
With one exception, the betas in Panel A are always positive. The off-gold portfolios were more sensitive to movements in the return on the British consol, stock, and bond indices than the on-gold portfolios. Movements in these well-diversified British indexes largely reflect business cycle shocks, suggesting that the higher unconditional returns associated with holding the off-gold country assets were compensation for bearing business cycle risk. During business cycle contractions the assets of countries off gold tended to lose more value than the assets of countries on gold. British investors demanded a premium to hold this additional business cycle risk, but it did not reflect a punishment for abandoning gold. A portfolio of British stocks and bonds with the same exposure to the British indexes generated statistically identical returns. Because these British assets were not being punished for violating the rules of the gold standard, we conclude that this excess return was compensation for business cycle risk and the amount of compensation per unit of beta exposure was identical across assets regardless of whether the country adhered to gold or not.
The results are similar in Panel B. Holding equity in a firm located in a country that did not adhere to gold did not yield a higher return than holding equity in a firm in a country on gold. Again, this result is robust to the choice of sample countries and weighting scheme.
The low R-squared statistics in Table 1 and 2 warrant a closer look. The Rsquared statistics are small because the model does a poor job of explaining the time series variation of our managed portfolios returns. This outcome is exactly what one would expect if adherence to the gold standard had no effect on asset prices. The Rsquared statistics may be small because variations in the British portfolios do a poor job of explaining variation in our managed portfolios or because gold standard adherence did not matter and selecting assets based on gold is equivalent to selecting assets at random.
If adhering to the gold standard had no effect on returns, selecting assets based on gold would be equivalent to assigning assets to portfolios at random. As the number of assets randomly assigned to each portfolio grows, the portfolio β 's would converge to population betas and the β 's of the on gold portfolio minus off portfolio would converge to zero as well.
We expect the R-squared statistics to be small when the British portfolios do a poor job of explaining risk or when gold standard adherence does a poor job of explaining returns. We can disentangle these competing causes by estimating regression (5) with the on-and off-gold gross returns and comparing the results to the excess return regression in equation (6). Table 3 reports the individual regression results for the on-and off-gold value-and equally weighted portfolios. The model does a good job of pricing both portfolios. The adjusted R-squared statistics are respectable for monthly databetween 15%-20%. In addition, the estimated coefficients in the separate on-and off-gold portfolios tend to be quite close to one another. Thus, when one computes excess returns by taking the difference between the off-and on-gold portfolios, the estimated coefficients and R-squared statistics are close to zero -exactly what one would expect if the gold standard did not matter.
In sum, a Victorian investor did not demand a risk premium for holding countries assets issued by countries off of gold. Had a Victorian investor tried to beat the market by betting that off-gold countries would outperform on-gold countries, he would have been unable to do so.
Robustness Checks: Random Portfolios
Portfolios selected with knowledge of adherence to the gold standard did not outperform portfolios of British assets with the same exposure to business cycle risk. We base this conclusion on the smallα values in Tables 1 and 2 . A test that α is equal to zero is a joint test of the good housekeeping hypothesis and the risk and return model implied by the excess return regression. To be certain that the small alphas are not due to model misspecification, we compare the alphas of the managed portfolios to the alpha an investor would have obtained if he selected assets purely at random.
For each type of asset and country sample in Tables 1 and 2 , we compute excess return portfolios by randomly assigning the same sample of assets to one of two portfolios. Assets are assigned in the same proportion as the proportion of gold standard adherence. We compute 1000 random portfolios and report the proportion of times the portfolio selected using the gold standard criterion earns a higher excess return than a portfolio selected at random.
For example, in the value-weighted Bordo-Rockoff sample of sovereign bonds, 56% of the observed returns were associated with bonds on gold. We compute a random excess return portfolio with the same assets by randomly buying 44% of the bonds each period and shorting the other 56%. We compute the random portfolio's α and repeat the random selection 1000 times. The result is 1000 random α 's.
If gold standard adherence didn't matter, we would expect portfolios selected based on gold standard adherence to do no better than portfolios selected at random. The simulation, which sorts the assets randomly to one or the other portfolio, directly addresses the question of whether sorting on the gold standard does better than sorting randomly. Tables 1 and 2 report the success rate -the proportion of times the managed portfolios beat portfolios formed at random. The results are consistent with the conclusion that gold standard adherence did not matter. On average, portfolios selected by gold standard adherence do no better than portfolios selected at random.
Robustness Check: Perfect Foresight Portfolios
The managed portfolios may reflect the market's anticipation that countries within each portfolio would resume or suspend the gold standard. If the market values adhering to the gold standard and expects a country off gold to return to gold, bond prices may rise in anticipation of resumption of specie payments. Likewise, if investors expect a country on gold to abandon gold they may sell in anticipation, driving down the price. The return of the off-gold portfolio minus the on-gold portfolio will be biased upwards if our dating procedure lags market expectations and the null hypothesis is true. To check the robustness of the results to anticipation affects, we form value-and equally weighted portfolios derived in the same manner as above, with the exception that changes in gold standard status are reflected one year before the actual change in status occurs. In other words, we assume that the Victorian investor perfectly anticipates whether a country joins or suspends the gold standard one year in advance.
Tables 4 and 5 contain the results for the perfect foresight portfolios.
Qualitatively, the results are very similar to Tables 1 and 2. Managed portfolios that select assets based on gold standard adherence do not generate excess returns even when the portfolio manager perfectly anticipates a change in gold standard status.
Robustness Check: Memory and Repeated Punishment
Our final robustness check recodes the data to reflect the market's memory of suspending the gold standard and the possibility that it punished such behavior. Bordo and Rockoff (1996) found that differences in yields were correlated with a country's long-term commitment to the gold standard. In the preceding tests, we code a country as adhering to the gold standard if they are on gold. However, some countries were on the gold standard, suspended convertibility for a brief period, and returned to gold at a lower par. The capital market may have viewed the return to gold at a lower par as a partial default that it should punished. In fact, Bordo and Kydland (1995) model a return to gold at a lower par as a default deserving punishment. If the capital market considered countries on gold at a lower par to be cheating, our managed portfolios based on gold convertibility miscodes some countries.
To assess the effect of memory in international lending, we recode the countries as follows. A country is considered to adhere to the gold standard if it is currently on gold at its original par. If a country is on gold, suspends convertibility, and returns to gold at a lower par, we recode this country as a "cheater". We consider this country as off gold for the period that it is off gold or on gold at a lower par. Countries that suspend convertibility are thus considered off gold until they return at the original par.
With this new coding, we recomputed our results and report them in Tables 6 and   7 . The results are robust to the new coding scheme. The off-gold minus the on-gold managed portfolios are statistically indistinguishable from British assets even when we use memory of past cheating to sort countries.
Conclusion
The good-housekeeping hypothesis predicts that the international capital market rewarded countries that adhered to the classical gold standard with a favorable cost of capital. Due to data limitations, past tests of this hypothesis did not measure actual returns. We address this shortcoming by introducing a new data set consisting of the 28-day holding period returns of sovereign bonds, colonial bonds, and stocks trading in London between 1870 and 1907. The new sample allows us to measure actual holding period returns and apply modern asset pricing models to evaluate the testable implications of the good housekeeping hypothesis.
We find no evidence in favor of the good-housekeeping hypothesis. The returns on assets issued by countries on and off gold are statistically identical. Portfolios formed by shorting assets issued by countries on gold and purchasing assets issued by countries off of gold do not outperform similarly risky British assets. Furthermore, portfolios selected with knowledge about gold standard adherence do not outperform portfolios selected completely at random.
These results are robust. We find no evidence of a gold standard effect across asset classes or country samples. These results persist even when we form portfolios with perfect foresight of gold standard regime change or assume the international capital market punished past departures from the rules of the game. Overall, these new data and tests suggest that countries which adopted the gold standard were not rewarded with a low cost of capital. Thus the gold standard did not necessarily serve as a transparent signal of prudent financial policies.
More broadly, these results shed new light on the perceived benefits of fixed exchange rate regimes. A widely cited benefit of the gold standard is that it reduced borrowing costs. We find that the choice of exchange rate regime had no impact on the cost of capital during the classical gold standard era. 
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